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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents the question of whether, under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. SS 1-16 ("the FAA" or "the 
Act"), a district court has the authority, notwithstanding a 
valid arbitration clause, to enjoin a party from pursuing 
arbitration on res judicata grounds arising from both a 
prior arbitration and a prior judgment. The district court 
exercised diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1332 as well as federal question jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1331 based on the alleged violations of the 
securities laws. Because the issues raised in the context of 
this appeal are purely legal, our standard of review is 
plenary. See Smith v. Magras, 124 F.3d 457, 460-61 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
On October 13, 1992, John J. Carroll and others sued 
John Hancock Distributors, Inc. ("Hancock") and eighteen 
other defendants in Carroll v. Hancock, 92-cv-5907 (E.D. 
Pa. 1995). The complaint primarily alleged violations of 
several federal and state statutes, along with various 
common law fraud theories, in connection with a series of 
limited partnership transactions. Thomas Olick ("Olick"), a 
former employee of Hancock and a registered life insurance 
agent, was a named defendant in the Carroll action. Olick 
attempted to assert a cross-claim against Hancock in the 
Carroll litigation, but the district court denied the claim in 
its entirety. The case was closed on November 30, 1994. 
 
During the pendency of that litigation, Olick filed, on 
December 2, 1992, a Statement of Claim with the National 
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") against Hancock, 
demanding the arbitration of disputes relating to certain 
limited partnership transactions -- the same transactions, 
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according to Hancock, that were the subject of the Carroll 
action. The NASD, on February 28, 1995, issued an 
arbitration award in favor of Olick and denied a number of 
third party claims asserted by Hancock. The record does 
not show that Hancock objected to the 1992 NASD 
arbitration based on the existence of the then pending 
Carroll litigation. 
 
On May 4, 1996, after the conclusion of both the Carroll 
case and the 1992 NASD arbitration, Olick filed with the 
NASD another Statement of Claim against Hancock seeking 
the arbitration of claims sounding in fraud, 
misrepresentation, tortious interference with business 
relations, slander, libel, and RICO violations. In response, 
Hancock moved the arbitration panel to dismiss this claim 
based on the res judicata effect of the prior 1992 
arbitration award and the judgment rendered in the Carroll 
action. Hancock in particular argued that Olick's 1996 
Statement of Claim arose from the same factual 
circumstances as the previous arbitration in 1992 as well 
as the prior federal judgment, and therefore principles of 
res judicata barred Olick from raising a claim that could 
have been raised at either the prior arbitration proceeding 
or the Carroll litigation. The arbitration panel, on February 
11, 1997, denied Hancock's motion to dismiss without a 
hearing or a discussion of the merits. So far as we are 
aware, that proceeding is still pending. 
 
Before the arbitration panel had denied Hancock's motion 
to dismiss the second arbitration, Hancock filed a 
complaint in the district court seeking a declaration that 
the claims raised by Olick in the 1996 arbitration were 
barred on res judicata grounds. Hancock also filed in the 
district court a motion seeking to preliminarily enjoin the 
NASD from further proceedings in resolution of the 1996 
arbitration. The district court, however, denied Hancock's 
motion and dismissed its complaint, holding that under the 
Federal Arbitration Act the arbitrator, and not the court, 
decides preclusion issues. While the district court noted 
what was, in its view, an absence of third circuit case law 
directly on point, it found persuasive a line of cases holding 
that courts are not to rule on the validity of various 
defenses to arbitration. See Conticommodity Services, Inc. v. 
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Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1223 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(timeliness of demand decided by arbitrator); North River 
Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (res judicata decided by arbitrator). 
 
In its order denying Hancock's motion for 
reconsideration, the district court declined to apply case 
law holding that courts, and not arbitrators, are to decide 
res judicata issues stemming from a prior judgment 
rendered by federal court. The district court found those 
cases distinguishable because they failed to address what it 
viewed as the "hybrid" situation raised -- namely, "whether 
an arbitrator or a federal court should determine the res 
judicata effect of both a prior arbitration and a prior federal 
court decision on an arbitration claim." D. Ct. Order, Nov. 
11, 1997, at 2 (emphasis in original). Hancock now appeals 
the district court's dismissal of its complaint and the denial 
of its motion for a preliminary injunction. 
 
II. Appellate Jurisdiction 
 
As a preliminary matter, Olick contests this court's 
jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Section 16 of the FAA 
governs the appealability of district orders with respect to 
arbitration and provides: 
 
       (a) An appeal may be taken from-- 
 
       (1) an order-- 
 
        (A) refusing a stay of any action under sectio n 3 of 
       this title, 
 
        (B) denying a petition under section 4 of this  title to 
       order arbitration to proceed, 
 
        (C) denying an application under section 206 o f this 
       title to compel arbitration, 
 
        (D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award 
       or partial award, or 
 
        (E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award; 
 
       (2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or 
       modifying an injunction against an arbitration 
       that is subject to this title; or 
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       (3) a final decision with respect to an arbitrat ion that 
       is subject to this title. 
 
9 U.S.C. S 16(a). While identifying the district court orders 
with respect to arbitration that are the subject of immediate 
appeal, the Act affirmatively removes appellate jurisdiction 
to review certain types of "interlocutory" orders: 
 
       (b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b ) of 
       title 28, an appeal may not be taken from an 
       interlocutory order-- 
 
       (1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of 
       this title; 
 
       (2) directing arbitration to proceed under section  4 of 
       this title; 
 
       (3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of th is 
       title; or 
 
       (4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subj ect to 
       this title. 
 
9 U.S.C. S 16(b). The general approach to appellate 
jurisdiction as set forth in the FAA is constrained; the Act 
typically precludes appellate review of orders allowing 
arbitration "until after the arbitration process has gone 
forward." Stedor Enterprises, Ltd. v. Armtex, Inc., 947 F.2d 
727, 730 (4th Cir. 1991); see also David D. Siegal, Practice 
Commentary, 9 U.S.C.A. S 16, at 352 (West Supp. 1997). 
Nevertheless, the FAA specifically states that any"final 
decision with respect to an arbitration," is immediately 
appealable, 9 U.S.C. S 16(a)(3), regardless of whether that 
decision allows the arbitration process to go forward. See 
Siegal, supra, at 352. Thus, the answer to the immediate 
question in considering our appellate jurisdiction critically 
turns on whether the district court orders were"final" or 
"interlocutory," and consequently subject to the 
jurisdictional hurdles set forth in section 16(b). See 
American Cas. Co. of Reading v. L-J, Inc., 35 F.3d 133, 136 
(4th Cir. 1996). 
 
Congress did not define a "final decision" for purposes of 
this section, and therefore we look to the prior, settled, 
usage of that term. A final decision, as that term is 
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commonly understood for purposes of appellate 
jurisdiction, refers to an order that "ends the litigation on 
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but 
execute the judgment." Oritz v. Doge, 126 F.3d 545, 547 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 
233 (1945)). Within the context of orders relating to 
arbitration, the decisive issue is "whether arbitrability was 
the sole issue presented in the action or whether the issue 
of arbitrability originated as part of an action raising other 
claims for relief." American Cas., 35 F.3d at 136; see also 
F.C. Schaffer & Assoc. v. Demech Contractors, Ltd. , 101 
F.3d 40, 41 (5th Cir. 1996). If the arbitration issue arises 
in what is known as an "embedded proceeding"-- that is, 
embedded in some broader context raising issues or claims 
for relief outside the arbitration context -- then the district 
court order addressing arbitration cannot be considered a 
final order subject to immediate appeal under section 
16(a)(3) and the appellant must search for another avenue 
of appellate jurisdiction under section 16(a). See Siegal, 
supra, at 352. Conversely, an appeal from an "independent 
proceeding" raising solely arbitration issues with no other 
claims for relief falls under section 16(a)(3) as an appeal 
from a final order because the litigation before the district 
has effectively ended on the merits. Id. at 352-53. It 
matters not whether the district court decision favors 
arbitration or litigation. Id. 
 
In this case, Hancock sought both legal and injunctive 
avenues for relief: a judgment declaring Olick barred from 
arbitration under the doctrine of res judicata, and an 
injunction halting the NASD from entertaining Olick's 
demand for arbitration. At first blush, it may be argued, as 
Olick seems to do, that Hancock's motion for a preliminary 
injunction is embedded within the broader complaint 
seeking a declaratory judgment, and hence the district 
court's denial of that injunction is not appealable under 
section 16(a)(3) or section 16(b)(4). Yet, there was only one 
issue before the district court, and that was whether Olick 
might properly seek arbitration of his claims against 
Hancock. When the district court decided that single issue 
in favor of arbitration, the litigation effectively ended, 
leaving nothing for the district court to do but enter 
judgment. Accordingly, this independent proceeding before 
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the district concluded in a final order and is therefore 
appealable under 9 U.S.C. S 16(a)(3). 
 
III. The Federal Arbitration Act 
 
Having established our jurisdiction, we now turn to the 
merits of this appeal. Because this case raises questions 
about the scope of the duty to honor an arbitration 
agreement, our analysis must begin with the Federal 
Arbitration Act. The FAA federalizes arbitration law and 
"creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and 
regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate 
. . . ." Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 25 n. 32 (1983). The operative language in the 
Act, as provided in section two, states that: 
 
       A written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
       contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce 
       to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
       out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to 
       perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement 
       in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
       controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, 
       or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
       save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
       the revocation of any contract. 
 
9 U.S.C. S 2. The parties agree that the arbitration 
agreement at issue falls within the ambit of the FAA. 
 
Because the FAA enforces arbitration agreements as a 
matter of federal law, the statute authorizes district court 
involvement in the arbitration process primarily in two 
ways. See Local 103 of the Int'l Union of Elec., Radio and 
Mach. Workers v. RCA Corp., 516 F.2d 1336, 1339 (3d Cir. 
1975). One such function of the court arises when a party 
resists arbitration under an existing arbitration clause. In 
this case, the FAA allows a district court to compel, or 
enjoin, arbitration as the circumstances may dictate. See 9 
U.S.C. SS 3, 4; Painewebber v. Hartmann , 921 F.2d 507, 
511 (3d Cir. 1990). The other basis of court involvement is 
found when enforcement of an arbitration award is sought. 
Here, the statute authorizes the district court to confirm, 
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vacate, or modify the award under a narrow scope of 
judicial review. 9 U.S.C. SS 9-11. 
 
Beyond these two areas, the statute does not authorize 
court involvement in enforcing arbitration and we have 
consistently admonished the courts "to exercise the utmost 
restraint and to tread gingerly before intruding upon the 
arbitral process." Lewis v. American Fed'n of State, County 
and Municipal Employees, 407 F.2d 1185, 1191 (3d Cir. 
1969); see also Local 103 of the Int'l Union of Elec., Radio 
and Mach. Workers v. RCA Corp., 516 F.2d 1336, 1339 (3d 
Cir. 1975). There is, of course, good reason for this 
restrained approach. Arbitration is, above all, a matter of 
contract and courts must respect the parties' bargained-for 
method of dispute resolution. See Local 1545, United Mine 
Workers Of Am., 876 F.2d 1288, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989). 
Indeed, arbitration most often arises in areas where courts 
are at a significant experiential disadvantage and 
arbitrators, who understand the "language and workings of 
the shop," may best serve the interest of the parties. See 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car 
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960); RCA Corp. , 516 F.2d at 
1340. Thus, there is a strong policy in favor of arbitration 
and courts must resist the attempt to intrude upon 
arbitration proceedings where the statute does not explicitly 
authorize court involvement. 
 
Turning to the district court's authority to enjoin 
arbitration, which is the heart of this dispute, we again 
explore the nature of the district court's involvement in the 
arbitration process. Here, the FAA states that a court may 
issue an order compelling arbitration only "upon being 
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or 
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue." 9 U.S.C. 
S 4. Starting with the familiar proposition that arbitration is 
a creature of contract, courts have long since drawn the 
conclusion that, as a matter of contract, no party can be 
forced to arbitrate an issue unless that party has entered 
into an agreement to do so. See AT&T Technologies v. 
Communication Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986). 
Because the competence of an arbitrator stems exclusively 
from contract, a district court may only order, or enjoin, 
arbitration based on the agreement to arbitrate itself. Id. 
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This includes, as a matter of course, an exploration into 
whether the parties entered into a valid arbitration 
agreement in the first instance, and whether the specific 
dispute raised falls within the scope of that agreement. See 
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 133 
F.3d 225, 228 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Thus, the threshold questions a district court must 
answer before compelling or enjoining arbitration are these: 
(1) Did the parties seeking or resisting arbitration enter into 
a valid arbitration agreement? (2) Does the dispute between 
those parties fall within the language of the arbitration 
agreement? See In re Prudential, 133 F.3d at 128, 133; 
Painewebber, 921 F.2d at 511. Absent a compelling federal 
policy to the contrary, see Shearson/American Express Inc. 
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1989), the sina qua non of 
arbitrability is simply stated: that a valid arbitration exists 
and the dispute falls within the contours of that agreement. 
In re Prudential, 133 F.3d at 128. As we have previously 
concluded, district courts need only "engage in a limited 
review to ensure that the dispute is arbitrable-- i.e., that 
a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties 
and that the specific dispute falls within the substantive 
scope of that agreement." Painewebber, 921 F.2d at 511. In 
conducting this limited review, the court must apply 
ordinary contractual principles, with a healthy regard for 
the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. Moses H. 
Cone, 460 U.S. at 24; In re Prudential, 133 F.3d at 128. 
 
A. The Res Judicata Dispute Between the Parties 
 
As the district court recognized, this case presents 
somewhat of a "hybrid" situation in that Hancock's 
objection to arbitrating Olick's claims stems from both a 
prior arbitration and a prior federal judgment. Apparently, 
no case to date has addressed this precise factual complex, 
and we will analyze each component of Hancock's position 
in turn. 
 
1. Res Judicata Based on a Prior Federal Judgment  
 
Notwithstanding the analysis discussed above, many 
federal courts have held as a matter of law that claims of 
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res judicata based on a prior federal judgment must be 
decided by the district court before compelling or enjoining 
arbitration. See, e.g., In re Y&A Group Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 
380, 382 (8th Cir. 1994); Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 985 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1993); 
Miller Brewing Co. v. Forth Worth Distrib. Co., 781 F.2d 794, 
499 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Miller v. Runyon , 77 F.3d 189, 
194 (7th Cir. 1996) (collecting other cases). These courts 
typically reason that federal courts must protect the finality 
and integrity of prior judgments. See Kelly, 985 F.2d at 
1069; In re Y&A, 38 F.3d at 382. As succinctly stated by 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, federal "[c]ourts 
should not have to stand by while parties re-assert claims 
that have already been resolved." Kelly, 985 F.2d at 1069. 
Because the FAA contemplates that an arbitration award 
may be enforced by judgment, see 9 U.S.C.S 9, these 
courts would allow a district court to enjoin arbitration if 
the claim would be precluded under ordinary rules of res 
judicata. Miller Brewing Co., 781 F.2d at 499. 
 
Not all courts, however, have been persuaded by such 
logic. Most notably, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
has held that a collateral estoppel defense to arbitration 
based on a prior federal judgment should be decided by an 
arbitrator because it is a merit-based defense to arbitration. 
See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 101 
F.3d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1996). Whether such a defense is 
itself arbitrable, like any other ambiguity in the scope of 
arbitration, must stem from the language of the arbitration 
agreement itself because arbitration is a matter of contract 
and a "defense based on the issue preclusive effect of the 
prior judgment is part of the dispute on the merits." Id. 
Thus, the court reasoned, unless it may be said"with 
positive assurance" that the parties intended to place the 
collateral estoppel issue with a court, the viability of that 
affirmative defense must be decided by an arbitrator. Id. 
 
These competing considerations present the court with a 
high order challenge. On the one hand, a realistic concern 
for the finality and integrity of judgments would arise if 
parties were free to ignore federal court decisions that have 
conclusively settled claims or issues now sought to be 
arbitrated. Yet, arbitration is a matter of contract and the 
 
                                10 
  
FAA only authorizes a "limited review" of the parties' intent 
before compelling or enjoining arbitration. See 
Painewebber, 921 F.2d at 511. The issue is thoughtfully 
discussed in Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 193-94 (7th Cir. 
1996), but that court fell short of providing a 
comprehensive answer. In the final analysis, we conclude 
that a decent respect for a precedent of this court dictates 
that we resolve the issue in favor of district court 
jurisdiction to decide the res judicata defense as it relates 
to a prior judgment. Thus, we stated in Telephone Workers 
Union of New Jersey v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 584 F.2d 
31 (3d Cir. 1978): 
 
        The district court did not reach the merits of the 
       Board of Arbitrators' interpretation of the Collective 
       Bargaining Agreement. It turned, first, to the judgment 
       preclusion effect of the Consent Decree. This was the 
       proper course. When a federal court is presented with 
       the contention that a prior federal judgment 
       determined issues now sought to be relitigated in an 
       arbitral forum it must first determine the effect of the 
       judgment. This is so whether the question arises in an 
       action to compel arbitration or, as here, in an action to 
       enforce a disputed award. The federal policy favoring 
       forum selection clauses, based in part on the 
       institutional interest of federal courts in avoiding 
       litigation, does not come into play until the courtfirst 
       determines whether prior completed litigation has 
       already finally determined all issues. 
 
Id. at 32-33 (citation omitted). In that case, an aggrieved 
employee sought arbitration of a matter that had been 
conclusively settled by a consent decree entered by a 
federal district court. Arbitration had in fact rendered a 
result that conflicted with the consent decree and the 
district court, in considering a motion to enforce the 
arbitrator's award, turned first to the issue preclusive effect 
of the consent decree. We affirmed on the principle that a 
district court must first determine the effect of a prior 
federal judgment when faced with the possibility of 
relitigating issues already settled by that judgment. 
Moreover, we explicitly stated that this was the correct 
course regardless of whether parties seek to compel 
arbitration or confirm a disputed award. 
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The district court did not apply our analysis in New 
Jersey Bell to this case because of the unique"hybrid" res 
judicata objection raised by Hancock -- "hybrid" in the 
sense that Hancock's claim of preclusion stems from both 
a prior judgment and a prior arbitration. We find no 
principled reason underlying this distinction. When a party 
resisting arbitration bases its claim of res judicata not only 
on a prior judgment but also on the existence of a prior 
arbitration, the analysis must focus on each aspect of the 
claim; hybrid facts do not call for a hybrid analysis. To be 
sure, there may be a number of factual grounds to 
distinguish our holding in New Jersey Bell, but the legal 
principle announced in that case directly controls the issue 
presented before the district court -- in particular, whether 
an arbitrator or a court must decide the preclusive effect of 
a prior federal judgment. Given the broadly worded 
language in that case, many courts have read New Jersey 
Bell, as do we, for the proposition the federal courts must 
intervene in the arbitration process when faced with res 
judicata objections stemming from a prior federal judgment. 
See Aircraft Braking Systems Corp. v. Local 856, Int'l Union, 
United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers , 97 
F.3d 155, 159 (6th Cir. 1996); John Morrell & Co. v. Local 
Union 304a of the United Food and Commercial Workers , 
913 F.2d 544, 562 (8th Cir. 1990); American Trade 
Dispatchers Assoc. v. Burlington N. R.R., 784 F. Supp. 899, 
903 (D.D.C. 1992). Thus, whether we honor our internal 
operating procedure governing the application of this 
court's precedent, see 3d Cir. IOP Chapter 9.1. ("[T]he 
holding of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on 
subsequent panels.") (emphasis added), or apply the 
pertinent language in New Jersey Bell, we conclude that 
the district court in this case should have first decided the 
preclusive effect of the prior federal judgment as it relates 
to Olick's demand for arbitration before the NASD. 
 
2. Res Judicata Based on the Prior Arbitration  
 
The question remains, however, whether the district 
court, under the FAA, may consider the preclusive effect of 
the prior NASD arbitration as a basis for enjoining the 
current NASD proceeding. We now turn to that issue. 
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As stated above, the judicial inquiry before compelling or 
enjoining arbitration is narrow, and the FAA authorizes the 
district court to explore only two threshold questions in 
considering a demand for arbitration: (1) Did the parties 
seeking or resisting arbitration enter into a valid arbitration 
agreement? (2) Does the dispute between those parties fall 
within the language of the arbitration agreement? See In re 
Prudential, 133 F.3d at 128, 133; Painewebber, 921 F.2d at 
511. While we have previously held that claims of res 
judicata based on a prior federal judgment are an 
exception, see Telephone Workers Union of New Jersey v. 
New Jersey Bell Tel., 584 F.2d 31-32 (3d Cir. 1978), res 
judicata objections based on a prior arbitration do not 
implicate the institutional concerns underlying that 
holding. Therefore, the proper analytical inquiry mandated 
under the FAA is to focus on both the existence of a valid 
arbitration agreement and the nature of that agreement as 
it relates to the parties' current dispute. 
 
We have previously held, for example, that where there is 
a contractual provision barring the re-arbitration of similar 
disputes between parties, the arbitrator is to decide the 
preclusionary effect, if any, of a previous arbitration. See 
Local 103 of the International Union of Elec., Radio, and 
Mach. Workers v. RCA Corp., 516 F.2d 1336, 1340 (3d Cir. 
1975). The reasoning underlying this approach is that a 
provision regarding the finality of arbitration awards is a 
creature of contract and, like any other contractual 
provision that is the subject of dispute, it is within the 
province of arbitration unless it may be said "with positive 
assurance" that the parties sought to have the matter 
decided by a court. Id. Although the contractual provision 
before the RCA court specifically stated that "in no event 
. . . shall the same question or issue be the subject of 
arbitration more than once," this court approved the same 
reasoning when faced with a broader agreement between 
parties that arbitration awards are "final and binding." Id. 
at 1341; see also Local 616, International Union of Elec., 
Radio, and Mach. Workers v. Byrd Plastics, Inc., 428 F.2d 
23, 25 (3d Cir. 1970). 
 
The parties' arbitration agreement in this case may be 
found in the "Uniform Application for Securities Industry 
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Registration," ("Form U-4") signed by Olick, which submits 
to the NASD "any dispute, claim, or controversy that may 
arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other 
person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, 
constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations with which I 
registered." Form U-4 P 5. The NASD Code of Arbitration 
Procedure provides for the "arbitration of any dispute, 
claim, or controversy arising out of or in connection with 
the business of any member of the Association, with the 
exception of disputes involving the insurance business of 
any member which is also an insurance company . . . ." 
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure P 3701. The parties do 
not contest the validity of the arbitration agreement here, 
nor do they dispute that Olick's claims raised before the 
NASD properly fall within the scope of the arbitration 
clause. Indeed, both Olick and Hancock explicitly agreed to 
"submit the present matter in controversy, as set forth in 
the . . . statement of claim, answers, cross claims and all 
related counterclaims and/or third party claims which may 
be asserted, to arbitration . . . ." NASD Uniform Submission 
Agreement P 1, Def.'s App. at 1. The only remaining 
question, therefore, is whether the parties intended the 
current controversy -- whether the prior NASD award 
precludes Olick from asserting his claims -- to be 
arbitrated as well. 
 
The arbitration procedure agreed to here, as incorporated 
in the arbitration agreement, states that all arbitration 
awards are to be "final and not subject to review or appeal." 
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure P 10330(b). Moreover, 
the parties agreed that "arbitrators shall be empowered to 
interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions 
under this Code and to take appropriate action to obtain 
compliance with any ruling by the arbitrator(s)." Id. 
P 10324. The NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure further 
provides that "[s]uch interpretations and actions to obtain 
compliance shall be final and binding upon the parties." Id. 
 
Given this language, we must conclude that Hancock's 
res judicata objection based on the prior arbitration is an 
issue to be arbitrated and is not to be decided by the 
courts. The procedural rules quoted above no doubt 
demonstrates the parties' intentional adherence to a 
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binding principle of finality similar to res judicata as 
applied to arbitration awards rendered by the NASD. It is 
equally quite clear from the arbitration procedure adopted 
here that the parties intended the NASD, and not the 
district court, to determine the nature and extent, if any, of 
that finality. Accordingly, the district court correctly 
declined to decide Hancock's res judicata objection based 
on the prior NASD award. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we will reverse the 
order of the district court dismissing the complaint and 
denying the preliminary injunction to the extent that it 
provides that Hancock's res judicata defense based on the 
prior judgment is an issue for resolution by the arbitrator. 
We, of course, express no opinion on the merits of that 
affirmative defense. To the extent the order of the district 
court dismissed Hancock's res judicata defense based on 
the prior arbitration, we will affirm. Accordingly, this case 
will be remanded for such further proceedings as may be 
appropriate. 
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